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Contemporary private terrorism constitutes a new kind of threat.  
It demands new kinds of thinking.1 
 
Abstract.  
The right of self-defence against non-State actors is increasingly invoked and accepted in 
the practice of States. However, the recognition of this right must overcome a 
fundamental obstacle: that of explaining why the rights of the host State, in particular its 
right of territorial sovereignty, is not infringed by the self-defensive force used within its 
territory. In practice, States invoking self-defence against non-State actors rely on the 
involvement of the host State with those actors to justify the use of force in that State’s 
territory. It is not clear, from a legal standpoint, how to rationalize the fact of 
involvement as a form of legal justification. For some, involvement amounts to 
attribution. For others, involvement is a form of complicity. For others still, involvement 
may entail a breach of the host State’s due diligence obligation to protect the rights of 
other States in its territory. All of these solutions are deficient in some way, and have 
failed to receive generalized endorsement. This article considers whether there may be a 
different, as yet neglected, solution: self-defence as a circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness. The article shows that this is not a perfect solution either, since positive 
law remains uncertain on this point. Nevertheless, it is a solution that may provide a 
better normative framework for the development of the law of self-defence against non-
State actors. 
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The use of force by non-State actors is an unfortunate but recurring phenomenon in 
international affairs. It is, to be sure, not a new phenomenon. One of the most famous 
episodes in the history of international law, the Caroline incident between the US and 
Great Britain in 1837, involved the use of cross-border force by insurgents. 2  In 
contemporary conditions, the threat posed by non-State actors’ uses of force is, however, 
greater than it has ever been. Technological and military advancements, as well as their 
availability to private actors, has exponentially increased non-State actors’ capacity for 
destruction.3 It is only necessary to read the daily news to realize just how devastating the 
actions of these irregular groups can be. How to deal with this phenomenon (in all its 
aspects) is one of the most pressing issues in, and most important challenges for, 
contemporary international law. 
 One of the central questions in this regard is that of the availability of a right of 
self-defence against non-State actors on the part of States that are victims of military 
attacks by these groups.4 Since 1945 at least, international law has envisaged a right of 
self-defence applicable in inter-State relations only: by a victim State against the aggressor 
State.5 In this framework, uses of force by armed bands and the like, to trigger the right 
of self-defence, had to be attributed to a State which would then become the author of 
the attack and the target of self-defensive force.6 But since the attacks on the World 
Trade Center on 9/11, States have increasingly called into question this understanding of 
the right of self-defence by invoking the right to respond to non-State actors’ uses of 
force.7 To cite two well-known examples, it was widely recognized that the US acted in 
self-defence against Al-Qaida in 2001,8 and Iraq and its allies, including France, the UK 
and the US, have asserted a right of self-defence (be it individual or collective) against 
                                                 
2 On which see, generally, R. Jennings, ‘The Caroline and McLeod Cases’, (1938) 32 AJIL 82. 
3 T. Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Article 51 of the UN Charter (2010), at 488. 
4 The discussion assumes that non-State actors operate in a cross-border fashion, from the territory 
of a different State. States are not prohibited by international law to use force within their own borders to 
tackle these threats, within limits imposed by human rights law and, if and to the extent applicable, 
humanitarian law. 
5 See, eg, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion of 9 July 2004, [2004] ICJ Rep. 136, at 194, para. 139. 
6 As asserted by the International Court of Justice in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), Merits Judgment of 27 June 1986, [1986] ICJ Rep. 14, at 103, 
para. 195. 
7 For a review of practice, see: Ruys, Armed Attack, at 447-472; R. van Steenberghe, La légitime 
défense en droit international public (2012), at 292-325; O. Corten, Le droit contre la guerre (2nd edn, 2014),at 743-
53.  
8 UNSC Res. 1368 (2001). The literature on the US’s exercise of self-defence in Afghanistan is vast. 
For a review of the facts and the main scholarly approaches, see: Becker, Terrorism and the State, ch 6. 
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ISIS in Syria.9 Whether this practice is sufficient (and sufficiently uniform)10 to evidence a 
change in the traditional understanding of self-defence is still a contentious issue.11 The 
most charitable view in this regard is that the use of force in self-defence against non-
State actors is not ‘not unambiguously illegal’;12 but even then, it is unclear that this view 
is generally accepted. 
In no small part, the difficulty with recognizing a right of self-defence against 
non-State actors is that of explaining why the State in whose territory those actors 
operate (the ‘host State’) is liable to the use of force within its territory. The ‘dilemma’, as 
Tom Ruys and Sten Verhoeven put it, is ‘clear’: 
On the one hand, it can not be accepted that states must simply undergo private 
attacks without having the right to defend themselves by using force against the 
home bases of these groups and their accomplices […] On the other hand, state 
sovereignty is and remains one of the basic pillars of international law and order 
and should not lightly be violated.13 
Why must the host State tolerate the infringement of its territorial sovereignty, or a 
(forcible) intervention in its affairs, or the impairment of, say, legally protected trade and 
other commercial relations, by the victim’s use of force? In considering this question, 
Kimberley Trapp has (rightly) observed that self-defence must ‘in some way excuse the 
                                                 
9 See summary record of the SC meeting of 20 November 2015, S/PV.7565, at 2 (France), 4 (US), 
9 (UK). See also the following letters to the Security Council: UN Docs. S/2014/695 (US); S/2014/851 
(UK); S/2015/745 (France). For scholarly analyses of the situation in Syria, see: L. Arimatsu and M.N. 
Schmitt, ‘Attacking “Islamic State” and the Khorasan Group: Surveying the International Law Landscape’, 
(2014) 53 Colum J Transnat’l L Bulletin 1; M. Hakimi, ‘Defensive Force against Non-State Actors: The State 
of Play’, (2015) 91 Int’l Legal Studies 1. The matter has also been addressed in numerous blog posts, e.g.: J.D. 
Ohlin, ‘The Unwilling or Unable Doctrine Comes to Life’, Opinio Juris, 23 September 2014, < 
http://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/23/unwilling-unable-doctrine-comes-life/>; M. Hakimi, ‘Assessing 
(Again) the Defensive Operations in Syria’, Just Security, 22 January 2015, 
<https://www.justsecurity.org/19313/assessing-again-defensive-operations-syria/>; C. Kreß, ‘The Fine 
Line Between Collective Self-Defense and Intervention by Invitation: Reflections on the Use of Force 
against “IS” in Syria’, Just Security, 17 February 2015, <https://www.justsecurity.org/20118/claus-kreb-
force-isil-syria/>; R. van Steenberghe, ‘From Passive Consent to Self-Defence after the Syrian Protest 
against the US-led Coalition’, EJIL:Talk!, 23 October 2015, <http://www.ejiltalk.org/13758-2/>. 
10 There are some methodological debates as to whether the practice should prove a modification of 
the rule or the existence of a new rule, on which see: O. Corten, Droit contre la guerre, at 35-63; R. van 
Steenberghe, ‘State Practice and the Evolution of the Law of Self-Defence: Clarifying the Methodological 
Debate’, (2015) 2 JUFIL 81. 
11 Ruys, Armed Attack, at 487-9, 531. 
12 Ruys, Armed Attack, at 531. The expression is taken from a paper of the UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, titled ‘Is intervention ever justified’, Foreign Policy Document no 148, 1986, 
reprinted in ‘UK Materials in International Law’, (1986) 57 BYIL 614. For a similar position, see: C. 
Antonopoulos, ‘Force by Armed Groups as Armed Attack and the Broadening of Self-Defence’, (2008) 55 
NILR 159. 
13 T. Ruys and S. Verhoeven, ‘Attacks by Private Actors and the Right of Self-Defence’, (2005) 10 J 
Conflict & Security Law 289 at 310. 
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violation of’ these rights of the host State if it is to be an effective mechanism.14 It may 
be added that the legal justification of the impairment of host State rights is necessary to 
avoid triggering the host State’s right of self-defence against the victim State; to uphold, 
in short, the principle that there is no self-defence against self-defence.15 Indeed, if the 
victim’s use of force is, from the standpoint of the host State, a forcible violation of its 
sovereignty, then why can the host State not react in self-defence against it?16 Farfetched 
as this may sound, a right of self-defence in these circumstances was invoked by Syria in 
the wake of indications by the US and other European powers that they intended to 
attack ISIS targets within Syria’s territory as an exercise of collective self-defence of 
Iraq.17 
  There are many disagreements as to the conditions and the legal ground of 
justification for the impairment of host State’s rights by self-defensive action—if one 
exists at all. At a bare minimum, States and scholars agree that any such justification must 
be grounded, in some measure, on the involvement of the host State with the non-State 
actors mounting the attack. This is evidenced by the references to, for example, the 
‘harbouring’ by Afghanistan of Al-Qaida18 and, most recently, by the claim of Iraq and 
the US that Syria was unwilling or unable to deal with ISIS in its territory.19 To be sure, 
host State involvement with the non-State actors warrants differential treatment 
                                                 
14 K. Trapp, ‘The Use of Force against Terrorists: A Reply to Christian J Tams’, (2009) 20 EJIL 
1049 at 1050. 
15 United States v von Weizsaecker et al (Ministries trial) (1949) 14 NMT 314, at 329. For an earlier 
statement of this principle, see: The Maria (1799) 1 C Rob 340, at 361 (‘it is a wild conceit, that wherever 
force is used, it may be lawfully resisted. A lawful force cannot be lawfully resisted’). See also, N. Lubell, 
Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Non-State Actors (2010), at 41; Y. Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence 
(5th edn, 2012), at 190. 
16 For this reason, the encroachment upon the host State’s rights must be justified (namely, 
rendered lawful) and not just excused. Excuse defences exclude the consequences of unlawfulness (eg, 
cessation and reparation), without having an effect on the illegality of the relevant conduct. If the 
infringement of host State rights were merely ‘excused’, this would mean that the victim State may not owe 
reparations to the host State, but it would not be enough to prevent the host State’s right of self-defence 
from being triggered: the use of force in its territory would remain unlawful and, if it reaches the required 
gravity, it could constitute an armed attack. On the distinction between justification and excuse in 
international law, see: V. Lowe, ‘Precluding Wrongfulness or Responsibility: A Plea for Excuses?’, (1999) 
10 EJIL 405; T. Christakis, ‘Les “circonstances excluant l’illicéité”: une illusion optique?’, in O. Corten et al 
(eds.), Droit du pouvoir, pouvoir du droit: Mélanges offerts à Jean Salmon (2007), 223; G. Scalese, La rilevanza delle 
scusanti nella teoria dell’illecito internazionale (2008); F. Paddeu, General Defences in International Law: Justification and 
Excuse in the Law of State Responsibility (2013), at ch 3, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of 
Cambridge. 
17 See T. Ruys and N. Verlinden, ‘Digest of State Practice: 1 July-31 December 2014’, (2015) 2 
JUFIL 119 at 135. According to the Syrian Minister of National Reconciliation Affairs ‘[a]ny action of any 
type without the approval of the Syrian government is aggression against Syria’, id. 
18 See, eg, the letters sent to the UN Security Council by: Canada: UN Doc. S/2001/1005; the 
European Union: UN Doc. S/2001/967; Germany: UN Doc. S/2001/1127; and New Zealand: UN Doc. 
S/2001/1193. 
19 See the references in note 7. 
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depending on the kind and degree of the relationship between the two. 20  Where 
involvement is enough for attribution of the private conduct to the State, self-defence 
can be exercised in an inter-State manner. 21  Where attribution is not possible, two 
questions arise: first, what kind and degree of involvement is necessary and, second, how 
to rationalize the fact of host State involvement into a ground of legal justification. As to 
the kind and degree of involvement, agreement seems to be coalescing around a standard 
of ‘unwillingness and inability’ of the host State to deal with the non-State actors.22 But 
host State involvement is a factual question,23 and does not, on its own, constitute a legal 
ground of justification. It is thus necessary to rationalize this fact into one such legal 
ground. The latter point is still controversial; many solutions have been proposed in the 
literature, but none of these has received general endorsement.24 
The majority of the debates on self-defence against non-State actors have centred 
on Article 51 of the Charter, 25  either to demonstrate that the restrictive inter-State 
understanding is not supported by the language of the provision or intended by the 
drafters,26 or to identify a different standard of attribution of the non-State actors’ attack 
to the host State.27 These works constitute a crucial step for the development of the law 
of self-defence, if this body of law is to adequately address the threat posed by non-State 
actors. Nevertheless, this focus has also produced the ‘dilemma’ that Ruys and 
Verhoeven mention: Article 51 (may) authorize the use of force against the non-State 
                                                 
20 For an example of this differential treatment, see: A. Becker Lorca, ‘Rules for the “Global War on 
Terror”: Implying Consent and Presuming Conditions for Intervention’, (2012) 45 NYU Journal of Int’l Law 
and Politics 1. 
21 Even in this case, the interference with the target State’s rights of territorial sovereignty and non-
intervention, among others, require legal justification, as will be explained in Section 2. 
22 On which see, generally, A. Deeks, ‘“Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative Framework for 
Extraterritorial Self-Defense’, (2012) 52 Va J Int’l L 483. See also: T. Reinold, ‘State Weakness, Irregular 
Warfare, and the Right of Self-Defense Post-9/11’, (2011) 105 AJIL 244. 
23 T. Ruys, ‘Crossing the Thin Blue Line: An Inquity into Israel’s Recourse to Self-Defense Against 
Hezbollah’, (2007) 43 Stan J Int’l L 265, 283 (noting that State involvement with non-State actors ‘is not 
easy to assess [and] ultimately boils down to a factual and contextual assessment’).  
24 See infra Section 3.2.2. 
25 Pursuant to art 51: ‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by 
Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council 
and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present 
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international 
peace and security’, 1945 Charter of the United Nations, 1 UNTS 16. 
26 See, eg, S. Murphy, ‘Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” in Article 51 of the UN 
Charter’, (2002) 43 Harv ILJ 42; R. van Steenberghe, ‘Self-Defence in Response to Attacks by Non-State 
Actors in the Light of Recent Practice: A Step Forward?’, (2010) 23 LJIL 183; S. Ratner, ‘Self-Defence 
Against Terrorists: The Meaning of Armed Attack’, in L. van den Herik and N. Schrijver (eds.), Counter-
Terrorism Strategies in a Fragmented International Legal Order - Meeeting the Challenges (2013), 334. 
27 van Steenberghe usefully reviews the arguments made under several of the ARS rules on 
attribution in van Steenberghe, Légitime défense, at 311-23. 
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actors, but it fails to address the relations between victim State and host State. In contrast 
with this approach, this study queries whether Article 21 of the Articles on the 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (‘ARS’) 28  may provide an 
answer to the ‘dilemma’.29 Pursuant to Article 21: 
 
The wrongfulness of an act of a State is precluded if the act constitutes a lawful 
measure of self-defence taken in conformity with the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
 
Curiously, the vast literature on self-defence against non-State actors has thus far 
overlooked Article 21. In fairness, this provision is mostly neglected in the scholarship 
on the use of force,30 and when actually addressed it has been largely misunderstood.31 
Can Article 21 provide the legal justification for the impairment of host State rights by 
self-defensive force used within its territory? 
 The study answers this question in three parts. First, in Section 2, it will begin by 
explaining the intended role and scope of Article 21 of the ARS. The section will 
describe the context and historical developments which rendered this provision 
necessary, and will show how, even though unacknowledged in practice, self-defence 
operates to preclude the wrongfulness of the infringement of other rights of the target 
State by lawful measures of self-defence. Second, in Section 3, the study then considers 
the possible application of Article 21 in the context of self-defence against non-State 
actors within the host State. Finally, Section 4 will provide some concluding remarks. 
 Before entering into the substance of this study, some methodological and 
terminological observations are necessary. As to the methodology, this study is limited to 
the theoretical question of how to justify the encroachment of host State rights by the use 
self-defensive force in its territory. In accordance with the trend in State practice, this 
                                                 
28 Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (hereinafter ARS and 
Commentary) Annexed to UN Doc A/RES/56/83 (2002). 
29 On this provision see, generally, J.M. Thouvenin, ‘Self-Defence’, in J. Crawford et al (eds), The 
Law of International Responsibility (2010), 455; J. Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part (2013); F. 
Paddeu, ‘Self-Defence as a Circumstance Precluding Wrongfulness: Understanding Article 21 of the 
Articles on State Responsibility’, (2014) 85 BYIL. (forthcoming). 
30 As an example, the recent Oxford Handbook on the Use of Force in International Law, edited by Marc 
Weller, and containing over 50 chapters, does not contain a chapter on Article 21. 
31 See, eg, T. Christakis and K. Bannelier, ‘La légitime défense en tant que “circonstance excluant 
l’illicéité”’, in R. Kherad (ed.), Légitimes défenses (2007) 233; T. Christakis and K. Bannelier, ‘La légitime 
défense a-t-elle sa place dans un code sur la responsabilité internationale?’, in A. Constantinides and N. 
Zaikos (eds.), The Diversity of International Law: Essays in Honour of Professor Kalliopi K Koufa (2009), 519. These 
authors consider that Article 21 is ‘useless’ (they use the term ‘inutile’ in French) insofar as the relations 
between the victim and aggressor States are concerned. 
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paper will assume that host State involvement with the non-State actors launching the 
attack is necessary. In particular, given its recent momentum, this paper will assume that 
the kind and degree of host State involvement necessary amounts to ‘unwillingness or 
inability’. The study will not, therefore, seek to prove or disprove this test by reference to 
State practice; equally, it will not elaborate on the precise content of the standard.32 As to 
terminology, in order to avoid confusion between the two provisions in Article 51 of the 
Charter and Article 21 ARS, the rule in Article 51 will be referred throughout as the ‘right 
of self-defence’ or the ‘primary rule of self-defence’, whereas the rule in Article 21 will be 
referred to as the ‘circumstance precluding wrongfulness’, ‘justification’ or ‘secondary 
rule’ of self-defence. This use of terminology should not suggest, however, that these are 
two different norms. As Section 2 will clarify, the customary law recognizes a right of 
self-defence, and its functions and effects in the international legal order are codified in 
two provisions: Article 51 excepting self-defence from the prohibition of force, and 
Article 21 providing a justification for the collateral impairment of rights of the target 
State by self-defensive force. 
 
2. Self-defence as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness 
Until 1945 the institution of the state of war (also known as ‘formal’ or ‘technical’ war) 
governed all of the legal relations existing between belligerent States.33 The state of war 
wholly excluded the law of peace, and replaced it with the law of war in the relations 
between belligerents.34 Moreover, (peace-time) treaties were terminated or, at the very 
least, suspended in the relations between the parties.35 As a result, the military measures 
adopted by either party to the conflict could not infringe or even impair the rights and 
obligations which governed their relations during peace. 
The state of war is now an institution of pure historical interest. Whether it is 
compatible with the Charter’s collective security system remains debatable,36 but it is 
certainly the case that States no longer claim to be in a ‘state of war’ when they are 
                                                 
32 For this, see: Deeks, ‘Unwilling or Unable’. 
33 The state of war consisted of the situation, condition or status during which the extraordinary law 
of war substituted the law of peace in the regulation of the relations between the parties to the conflict, see 
Q. Wright, ‘When does War Exist?’, (1932) 26 AJIL 362 at 363. 
34 S. Neff, War and the Law of Nations (2005), at 177. 
35 See, eg, North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case (Great Britain/US) (1910) 11 RIAA 167, at 181 
(‘International law in its modern development recognizes that a great number of Treaty obligations are not 
annulled by war, but at most suspended by it’). The doubts surrounding this question in the early 20th 
century were described by C. Hurst, ‘The Effect of War on Treaties’, (1921) 2 BYIL 37. 
36 For a summary of the scholarly debate see Neff, War, at 335-40.  
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engaged in armed conflict. 37  In contemporary conditions, States engaged in armed 
conflict remain ‘formally at “peace”’,38 which means that all their legal relations remain in 
force throughout the period of hostilities.39 In these conditions, the use of force can 
impair a multiplicity of obligations existing between the two States engaged in conflict. 
For example, when the use of force occurs in the target State’s territory, that force will 
constitute a breach of the prohibition of force, and it will also, among others, be an 
impairment of the target’s territorial sovereignty 40  and of its right to be free from 
intervention.41 
 Ordinarily, these impairments constitute breaches of international law. But what 
if a State resorts to force in self-defence? Customary international law recognizes the right 
of States to use force in self-defence when they are the victims of an armed attack. This 
is a unanimously accepted entitlement,42 codified in Article 51 of the UN Charter and 
regularly described as an ‘exception’ to the prohibition of force.43 Resort to force in self-
defence, being excepted from the prohibition of force, does not therefore constitute an 
infringement of that prohibition. That use of force is lawful by reference to the 
prohibition of force itself. But what about the other legal relations just mentioned, is 
defensive force lawful also by reference to these legal relations? As will be seen, Article 21 
of the ARS is intended to justify the impairment caused by lawful force on these other 
legal relations. 
                                                 
37 See the exhaustive review of practice in M. Mancini, Stato di guerra e conflitto armato nel diritto 
internazionale (2009), ch 4. See also, for practice related to commercial and economic relations, S. Silingardi, 
Gli effetti giuridici della guerra sui rapporti economici e commerciali (2012). 
38 ARS art 21 Commentary, at para. 2. See also J. Crawford, Second Report on State Responsibility, 
UN Doc. A/CN.4/498 and Add.1-4 (1999), at 75, para. 299. 
39 Including treaties, at least as a matter of principle. See art 3 of the ILC’s Articles on the Effects of 
Armed Conflict on Treaties, with Commentaries, Report of the ILC on the work of its sixty-third session, 
UN Doc. A/66/10 (2011).  
40 Nicaragua, Memorial of Nicaragua, 30 April 1985, ICJ Pleadings, vol IV, at 115; Border and 
Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v Honduras), ICJ, Application instituting proceedings, 28 July 1986, at 5-
7; Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v Costa Rica), ICJ, Memorial of Nicaragua, 19 August 1987, 
at 109; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v Burundi), ICJ, Application instituting proceedings, 
23 June 1999, at 15-9; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v Rwanda), ICJ, Application 
instituting proceedings, 23 June 1999, at 16-9; Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 (India v Pakistan), ICJ, 
Application instituting proceedings, 21 September 1999, at section II; Land and Maritime Boundary between 
Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), ICJ, Cameroon statement, CR 2002/7, 
at 36, para. 7; Legality of the Use of Force (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia v Belgium), Preliminary Objections, 
Judgment of 15 December 2004, [2004] ICJ Rep. 279, at 283, para. 1; Certain Activities Carried out by 
Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), ICJ, Application instituting proceedings, 18 November 
2010, at 4. 
41 Nicaragua, Memorial of Nicaragua, at 120; Nicaragua v Honduras, Application instituting 
proceedings, 5-7; Cameroon v Nigeria, CR 2002/7, at 36, para. 7; DRC v Burundi, Application instituting 
proceedings, at 15-9; DRC v Rwanda, Application instituting proceedings, at 16-19; Certain Activities 
(Nicaragua v Costa Rica), Memorial of Nicaragua, at 55ff. 
42 Nevertheless, ambiguities and differences of opinion remain about the meaning and scope of the 
various conditions and requirements of the exercise of the right.  
43 See, eg, Murphy, ‘Concept of “Armed Attack”’, at 44. 
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The next two sections unpack Article 21 in an effort to elucidate its role in the 
international legal order. The analysis will be performed in two steps. First, the legal 
relations between the victim and the aggressor State will be considered. For analytical 
purposes, the legal relations between these two States will be divided into three 
categories and the interaction between self-defence and each of these categories will be 
considered. Second, this section will consider the question of third-party rights and 
whether self-defence can provide a justification for the forcible interference of third 
State’s rights. As will be seen later, this is an issue of special relevance where self-defence 
is exercised against a non-State actor within the territory of the host State. 
   
2.1. Effects of self-defence on victim-aggressor State relations 
The first step in understanding the function and scope of Article 21 is to separate the 
legal relations existing between the States involved in an armed conflict into three 
categories. First is the relation governed by the prohibition of force and its exception, the 
right of self-defence. Second are all the other legal relations (conventional or customary) 
existing between those States. These comprise an ‘infinite variety’44 and include the rights 
of territorial sovereignty and non-intervention, trade and commercial rights, treaties for 
the exchange of technology, and so on. Third is the category of legal relations which 
impose ‘obligations of total restraint’, 45  including (some) rules of international 
humanitarian law and human rights law. As will be explained in what follows, the 
customary right of self-defence provides a legal ground of justification for the breach of 
the first and second sets of legal relations. These effects are codified in separate 
provisions: the legality of force under the first legal relation is addressed by Article 51, 
the legality of the impairment by (defensive) force of the second set of legal relations is 
addressed by Article 21.46 The third set of legal relations cannot be impaired even when 
acting in self-defence. 
 
                                                 
44 The expression is taken from: R.R. Baxter, ‘International Law in “Her Infinite Variety”’, (1980) 29 
ICLQ 549. 
45 ARS art 21 Commentary, at para. 4. The expression is the ICJ’s: Legality of the Threat or Use of 
Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, [1996] ICJ Rep. 226, at 242, para. 30. 
46 It may be worthwhile to recall that, as clarified by the ICJ in Nicaragua, Article 51 is not a 
complete statement of the law of self-defence as this exists in customary law. Customary law (to which a 
renvoi is made by Article 51’s reference to the ‘inherent right’) complements the Charter provision. See: 
Nicaragua, at 94, para. 176.  
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2.1.1. First legal relation: On the legality of resort to force 
States are bound, under international law, by an obligation not to use force against one 
another. The prohibition, codified in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, is widely regarded 
as one of jus cogens.47 This obligation not to use force possesses (at least) one exception in 
the form of a right of self-defence.48 What this means, essentially, is that States are bound 
to respect their obligation not to use force unless they are the victims of an armed attack, 
in which case they are authorized to respond to force with (defensive) force. 
 The structural relation between the prohibition of force and the right of self-
defence is very complex, and it has been conceptualized in many different ways. The ILC 
construed the prohibition of force and its exception of self-defence as a single norm.49 
The prohibition of force and the right of self-defence, in other words, are two segments 
of an over-arching norm which can be restated, in simplified but relevant part, as follows: 
‘the use of force is prohibited except in self-defence against an armed attack’. In 
conceptualizing the norm in this way, the ILC was accommodating the opinions of States 
according to which the use of force in self-defence is not inconsistent with the 
prohibition of force and that it is, rather, lawful ab initio.50 In this understanding, the 
exception of self-defence constitutes a limit on the material scope of the prohibition. 
Thus, the prohibition of force would be applicable only if there were a non-defensive use 
of force and defensive force would fall wholly outside of the prohibition’s scope of 
application.51 
                                                 
47 For a thorough review of the relevant practice, see Corten, Droit contre la guerre, 341-59. A 
significant number of judges and scholars support the peremptory status of the prohibition of force: 
Nicaragua, sep op President Singh, at 153; sep op Judge Sette-Camara, at 199; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of 
Iran v United States of America), Merits Judgment of 6 November 2003, [2003] ICJ Rep. 161, sep op Judge 
Kooijmans, at 260, para. 46; diss op Judge Elaraby, at 291; sep op Judge Simma, at 327, para. 6; Palestinian 
Wall, sep op Judge Elaraby, at 254; Ruys, Armed Attack, at 27; O. Dörr and A. Randelzhofer, ‘Article 2(4)’, 
in B. Simma et al (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2012) vol 1, 200 at 231; van 
Steenberghe, Légitime défense, at 137-40. 
48 There are other exceptions too, see: S. Helmersen, ‘The Prohibition of the Use of Force as Jus 
Cogens: Explaining Apparent Derogations’, (2014) 61 NILR 167. 
49 ARS art 21 Commentary, at para. 1. This reading was endorsed by Judge Tomka in: Case 
Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v Uganda), Merits Judgment of 19 December 2005, 
[2005] ICJ Rep. 168, Declaration Tomka, at 353-4. 
50 See e.g., Ethiopia: UN Doc. A/C.6/35/SR.51, at 12, para. 46; Hungary: UN Doc. 
A/C.6/35/SR.55, at 12, para. 45; Mongolia: UN Doc. A/C.6/35/SR.53, at 8, paras. 29-30; Spain: UN Doc. 
A/C.6/35/SR.55, at 4, para. 11; Trinidad and Tobago: UN Doc. A/C.6/35/SR.56, at 6 para. 26; (then) 
USSR: A/C.6/35/SR.52, at 14, para. 63. On this point, see: Crawford, Second Report, 74-5. 
51 Kammerhofer describes this approach as a ‘gap’ in the prohibition of force: J. Kammerhofer, 
Uncertainty in International Law: A Kelsenian Perspective (2011), at 9. 
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 The ILC’s approach is, to be sure, not uncontested and has been criticised for its 
artificiality.52 Indeed, the relation between the two could be construed differently, in a 
way that upholds the autonomy of the right of self-defence from the prohibition of force. 
In this construction there would be two rules, the prohibition and the right, both 
applicable to the same set of facts: the use of defensive force would be banned under the 
prohibition of force and permitted by the right of self-defence. The two rules would, 
therefore, be in a normative conflict. To conclude in favour of the legality of self-defence, 
the right of self-defence must be able to set aside the application of the prohibition. This 
construction of the relation between the prohibition and the right runs into an obvious 
obstacle: the prohibition’s peremptory status. As a jus cogens rule, the prohibition cannot 
be set aside, 53  and the conflict would be resolved by the lex superior principle: the 
prohibition would prevail over the right, with the result that defensive force is unlawful. 
This is a paradoxical conclusion, in utter contradiction with the practice of States. The 
paradox can be overcome in one of two ways. First, by ‘elevating’, so to speak, the right 
of self-defence to a peremptory rule. In this case, the conflict would arise between two 
peremptory rules and could potentially be resolved by application of the lex specialis 
principle.54 Since self-defence is the most factually specific of the two rules, it would set 
aside the prohibition of force in the circumstances. Alternatively, it could be argued that 
only the prohibition of aggression possesses peremptory status. The resulting conflict 
between self-defence and the prohibition of force would be a conflict between ‘ordinary’ 
rules, in which self-defence would again prevail as the factually most specific rule. Both 
solutions, however, lack grounding in positive law: States do not accept the jus cogens 
status of the right of self-defence, 55  and they do uphold the jus cogens status of the 
prohibition as a whole.56 The ILC’s solution, artificial as it may be, appears to be the 
most descriptively accurate understanding of this relation.57  
                                                 
52 E.g. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, UN 
Doc A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006, at 52-53, para. 95; J. Green, ‘Questioning the Peremptory Status of the 
Prohibition of the Use of Force’, (2011) 32 Mich J Int’l L 215; A. de Hoogh, ‘Jus Cogens and the Use of 
Armed Force’, in M. Weller (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (2015),1161 at 1172-
5. 
53 As confirmed by ARS art 26: ‘The wrongfulness of any act of a State which is not in conformity 
with an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law.’ 
54 Assuming that conflicts between peremptory rules are resolved by reference to the principles of 
priority. 
55 van Steenberghe, Légitime défense, 118. 
56 See references supra, at note 47. It may be added that distinguishing ‘aggression’ from ‘force’ is 
not a simple task either in theory or in practice, on which see: C. Díaz Barrado, El consentimiento, causa de 
exclusión de la ilicitud del uso de la fuerza en derecho internacional (1989), 74-5. 
57 See further, Paddeu, ‘Self-Defence’, at section II. 
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 In whatever way the relation is construed, the point is that the right of self-
defence constitutes an authorization to use force where force would otherwise be banned. 
To put it in symbolic terms, Article 51 of the Charter authorizes conduct otherwise 
prohibited by Article 2(4). When a State resorts to force in self-defence, Article 51 in a 
sense ‘takes care’ of the inconsistency existing between that force and Article 2(4): either 
by limiting the prohibition’s scope or by setting aside its application in the circumstances. 
Crucially, however, the right of self-defence is not an authorization to impair all other 
rights of the aggressor State.58 
 
2.1.2. Second set of legal relations: ‘Other’ rights of the aggressor State 
The victim and aggressor States are also bound by an ‘infinite variety’ of other rights and 
obligations, be they customary or conventional. All of these other rights can potentially 
be impaired by military measures. The case-law of the ICJ and other international 
tribunals shows the great variety of rules of international law potentially impaired by the 
use of force: commercial obligations under bilateral treaties,59 aviation agreements,60 the 
obligation to settle disputes peacefully,61 and so on. Indeed, as the ICJ made clear in the 
Oil Platforms case, international obligations may be breached by whatever means: by the 
decision of a court, by an act of Parliament, or by the use of force.62 
The question thus emerges whether the impairment of these obligations through 
defensive force is unlawful, or whether these impairments may be justified if the military 
force was resorted to in self-defence. Of course, it is perfectly plausible that these 
interferences are unlawful even if the State using force was acting in self-defence. As the 
                                                 
58 From the standpoint of Charter law, it could be argued that the language of art 51 does indeed 
authorize the impairment of other Charter-rights of the aggressor State. Thus, art 51 states that ‘nothing in 
the present Charter shall impair…’. Nevertheless, art 51 cannot authorize the impairment of customary 
rights. Art 103 of the Charter is not helpful in this regard. To begin with, it is limited to other conventional 
rights—though it seems logical that it may extend to customary rights as well. At any rate, art 103 gives 
priority to obligations arising under the Charter and not to rights. 
59 See, eg, Nicaragua’s claims at: Memorial of Nicaragua, Nicaragua, ICJ Pleadings, vol IV, 110-11, 
and oral statement, ICJ Pleadings, vol V, 210-12. For Iran’s claims, see: Oil Platforms, at 166, para. 1; also at 
176, para. 26. 
60 See, eg, Memorial of Iran, Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Iran v USA), at 146 (breach of the Chicago 
Convention), 182 (breach of the Treaty of Amity), 238 (both). 
61 See, eg, Guyana v Suriname, Award, 17 September 2007, UNCLOS Annex VII Tribunal, at 147, 
para. 445, and dispositif at 165, para. 2, on the obligation to solve disputes peacefully contained in art 279 
of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1833 UNTS 397. 
62 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America), Preliminary Objection Judgment of 
12 December 1996, [1996] ICJ Rep. 803, at 811-12, para. 21: ‘The Treaty of 1955 imposes on each of the 
Parties various obligations on a variety of matters. Any action by one of the Parties that is incompatible 
with those obligations is unlawful, regardless of the means by which it is brought about. A violation of the 
rights of one party under the Treaty by means of the use of force is as unlawful as would be a violation by 
administrative decision or by any other means.’ 
© Federica I Paddeu 
 
13 
ICJ stated in Croatia v Serbia ‘[t]here can be no doubt that, as a general rule, a particular 
act may be perfectly lawful under one body of legal rules and unlawful under another.’63 
Thus, self-defence may be lawful in relation to the prohibition of force and be unlawful 
in relation to, for example, the right of territorial sovereignty. Namely, a use of force may 
be compatible with the first legal relation mentioned above, but incompatible with the 
second set of legal relations. 
Article 21 is concerned precisely with the justification of the collateral, so to 
speak, impairment of the aggressor State’s rights caused by self-defensive force. The 
provision reflects a recurrent, if not directly acknowledged, phenomenon in practice.64 
The ICJ, for example, has never directly acknowledged that self-defence may justify these 
collateral violations, though this effect can be deduced from its decisions in Nicaragua and 
DRC v Uganda. In Nicaragua the Court found that the violation of Nicaragua’s territorial 
sovereignty and non-intervention by US military operations was not justified by self-
defence because, on the facts of the case, the US did not have a right of (collective) self-
defence.65 The same reasoning can be found in DRC v Uganda, where the Court found 
that, since Uganda did not have a right of self-defence, its actions breached the DRC’s 
rights of territorial sovereignty and non-intervention.66 A contrario, it may be inferred that 
if the US and Uganda had a right of self-defence against Nicaragua and the DRC 
respectively, then there would have been no breach of those rights either. In State 
practice, the parties’ pleadings in Oil Platforms are especially instructive in this regard. On 
the question whether self-defence could justify the breach of the Iran-US 1955 Amity 
Treaty,67 the US, directly invoking Article 21, maintained that ‘[a]ny actions of the US 
deemed incompatible with Article X of the Treaty would not be wrongful by the 
operation of this principle [self-defence] of customary international law.’ 68  Iran also 
accepted this proposition, and said that: 
                                                 
63 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v Serbia) ICJ, 
Judgment of 3 February 2015, at para. 474. (not yet reported) 
64 For additional examples in practice, see: Paddeu, ‘Self-Defence’. 
65 Nicaragua, at 126, paras. 247-9, on prohibition of intervention; 128, para. 251, on territorial 
sovereignty. 
66 DRC v Uganda, at 227, para. 165, and 280, para. 345.1. Note that the Court only refers to the 
principle of non-use of force and the principle of non-intervention in the dispositif, even though the DRC 
had claimed also a breach of its territorial sovereignty and the Court had addressed it in its reasoning. For 
the DRC’s prayer for relief, see: Memorial of the DRC, 273. 
67 1957 Iran-US Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, 284 UNTS 93. 
68 US Rejoinder, Oil Platforms, at 141, para. 5.02. The US’s argument on this point changed 
throughout the pleadings, for a brief summary (in what concerns the point of art 21), see: Paddeu, ‘Self-
Defence’ (forthcoming). 
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[A]ction otherwise lawfully taken in self-defence could constitute a circumstance 
precluding wrongfulness in relation to Article X, paragraph 1, of the Treaty. In 
other words, it accepts the proposition contained in Article 21 of the ILC Articles 
on the Responsibility of States.69 
Iran later added that if made out, self-defence would ‘exonerate the United States 
entirely; it would provide a complete justification for their conduct, in accordance with 
Article 21 of the ILC’s Articles.’70 
 At customary law, then, it appears that self-defence can also justify the collateral 
impairment of these obligations by means of force. Article 21 simply reflects this 
additional function of the right of self-defence in the international legal order. It is worth 
pointing out that this is not an additional norm in the legal order, capable of going 
beyond the right of self-defence. Simply put, Article 51 and Article 21 codify different 
effects of the exercise of the customary right of self-defence in the legal order. Article 51 
concerns its effect on the prohibition of force, and Article 21 the effects of that exercise 
on other legal relations. 
 
2.1.3. Third set of legal relations: Obligations of ‘total restraint’ 
Self-defence, however, cannot justify the collateral impairment brought about through 
force of all obligations of the victim State (or rights of the aggressor State). The 
Commentary to Article 21 expressly excludes from the scope of this provision what it 
termed, following the ICJ’s advisory opinion in Nuclear Weapons,71 the ‘obligations of total 
restraint’.72 By these are meant those obligations ‘expressed or intended to apply as a 
definitive constraint even to States in armed conflict’, including non-derogable human 
rights, the ‘intransgressible’ 73  principles of international humanitarian law and other 
obligations designed to place a limit on the conduct of hostilities.74 This exclusion was 
accepted by Iran in Oil Platforms,75 and by Uganda in DRC v Uganda, whose memorial 
explicitly stated that self-defence may in no circumstances justify breaches of human 
rights and humanitarian law.76 Since the impairment of these obligations may not be 
justified by self-defence, no more will be said about them in this study. 
                                                 
69 Iran statement, Oil Platforms, CR 2003/5, at 41, para. 29. (references omitted) 
70 Iran statement, Oil Platforms, CR 2003/7, at 51, para. 3. 
71 Nuclear Weapons, at 242, para. 30. 
72 ARS art 21 Commentary, at para. 4. 
73 The term is, once again, taken from the ICJ’s judgment in Nuclear Weapons, at 242, para. 30. 
74 ARS art 21 Commentary, at para. 4. 
75 Iran statement, Oil Platforms, CR 2003/5, at 41, para. 29. (references omitted) 
76 Uganda Memorial, DRC v Uganda, at 232-3, paras. 5.93-94. 




2.2. The effect of (defensive) force on third States? 
The Commentary to Article 21 specifies that the ‘essential effect’ of this provision ‘is to 
preclude the wrongfulness of conduct of a State acting in self-defence vis-à-vis an 
attacking State.’77 And yet, the use of force in international relations may, in addition, 
affect the rights of third (neutral) States. Can self-defence justify the impairment of these 
States’ rights? 
During the first reading of the ARS, the Commission had entirely foreclosed the 
possibility that self-defence may justify the impairment of third States’ rights. The 
commentary to draft Article 34, the predecessor to Article 21, was clear in this regard: 
The Commission [wished] to point out that the provision in article 34 is not 
intended to preclude the wrongfulness of, so to speak, indirect injury that might 
be suffered by a third State in connection with a measure of self-defence taken 
against a State which has committed an armed attack.78 
The interests of third parties were, therefore, ‘fully protected’.79 But during the second 
reading of the ARS, the Commission changed its position. Prompted by Special 
Rapporteur Crawford,80 the ILC observed in 1999 that ‘a State acting in self-defence 
might be entitled to take action against a third State’ and that ‘there was no need to make 
an explicit reference to that circumstance’ in the text of, or Commentary to, Article 21 
since the issue ‘was adequately covered by the relevant primary rules.’81 To reflect this, 
the Commentary to Article 21 currently indicates that this provision ‘leaves open all 
issues of the effect of action in self-defence vis-à-vis third States.’82 
 
2.3. Interim conclusions 
A brief summary of the discussion so far may be useful before turning to the application 
of Article 21 to the exercise of self-defence against non-State actors. When a State resorts 
to force in self-defence, it does so against the background of the complex web of legal 
relations which bind it to the aggressor State (and third States). For analytical clarity, 
these legal relations were divided into three sets since the effect of the right of self-
                                                 
77 ARS art 21 Commentary, at para. 5. 
78 Commentary to art 34, ILC, Report of the Commission on the work of its thirty-second session, 
UN Doc. A/35/10 (1980), at 61, para. 28. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Crawford, Second Report, at 76, para. 302. 
81 ILC, Report of the Commission on the work of its fifty-first session, UN Doc. A/54/10 (1999), 
at 77, para. 321. 
82 ARS art 21 Commentary, at para. 5. 
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defence on each of them is codified in different provisions. First is the prohibition of 
force. When force is resorted to in self-defence it does not constitute a breach of the 
prohibition since self-defensive force is excepted from the scope of the prohibition. In 
conventional law, the legality of the use of force is grounded on Article 51 of the UN 
Charter. Second, is the category of ‘other’ obligations of the victim State (or ‘other’ rights 
of the aggressor) which may be impaired by forcible measures including territorial 
sovereignty, non-intervention, commercial or other trade rights, and so on. The 
impairment of these obligations is also justified by self-defence: if the force that 
encroached upon them, in other words, constitutes a lawful exercise of the right of self-
defence in international relations. 83  This justifying effect of self-defence, a sort of 
incidental effect of self-defence, is codified in Article 21 of the ARS. Third, is the category 
of legal relations which impose absolute restraints on States, even when acting in self-
defence, including non-derogable human rights and ‘intransgressible’ humanitarian law 
rules. The impairment of these obligations may not be justified, even by reference to the 
right of self-defence. Finally, Article 21 and its Commentary leave open the question 
whether the impairment of host State rights by self-defensive force may be justified.  
 
3. The circumstance precluding wrongfulness of self-defence and the use of 
force against non-State actors 
The ILC’s work on Article 21 assumed the exercise of self-defence in an inter-State 
context.84 So long as self-defence is exercised as between two States—including when the 
armed attack is private but attributable to that State85—and the resort to force complies 
with the requirements of the jus ad bellum, then self-defence will also produce the 
incidental effect of justifying collateral violations of the aggressor State’s rights. Could 
this provision be applied to situations involving unattributable armed attacks by non-
State actors; namely, to situations where self-defence is exercised against a non-State 
                                                 
83 Art 21 requires compatibility both with the jus ad bellum and with the jus in bello, see Commentary, 
at para. 6. The discussion in this paper will only consider the issue from the standpoint of the jus ad bellum. 
84 ARS art 21 Commentary, at para. 5. 
85 Through whichever rule of attribution recognized in the ARS or, even, a lower standard of 
attribution recognized in the primary law, on which see: Crawford, General Part, at 158. See also C. Tams, 
‘The Use of Force against Terrorists’, (2009) 20 EJIL 359 at 385-8; G. Nolte and A. Randelzhofer, ‘Article 
51’, in B. Simma et al (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (2012) vol 2, 1397 at 1416; 
Corten, Droit contre la guerre, at 717-58. See also van Steenberghe, cited above, for a review of relevant 
arguments. 
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actor within the territory of the host State, so as to justify the impairment of host State 
rights by the defensive force?86  
There is a crucial distinction between the ‘essential’ case covered by Article 21 
and the present scenario, in that in the present scenario there is an additional party: the 
non-State actor. This additional party intrudes at the level of the first legal relation. The 
prohibition of force is, of course, owed as between the two States, the victim and the 
host State. Nevertheless, the exception of self-defence accommodates (or can 
accommodate) a third party: the non-State actor. The victim State is under an obligation 
not to resort to force unless it is the victim of an attack, which could include attacks by a 
private party. 87  In positive terms, a State would be authorized to resort to force in 
international relations, whenever it is the victim of an armed attack—regardless of its 
source. This authorization is codified in Article 51 of the Charter which, in a sense, takes 
care of Article 2(4) whenever force is used in self-defence. Article 51 ensures that 
defensive force is not incompatible with the prohibition in Article 2(4), even if the 
defensive force is directed against a non-State actor. But this additional party is not 
accommodated by the second set of legal relations: these exist as between the victim 
State and the host State only. It is precisely for this reason that the ‘dilemma’ arises to 
begin with: while the victim may have a right of self-defence against the non-State actors, 
the defensive force encroaches upon the rights of a different entity, the host State. 
Scholars have articulated different ways to resolve this dilemma. As noted in the 
Introduction, all these solutions have at their basis the (factual) premise of host State 
involvement with the private groups mounting the armed attack. The type and degree of 
involvement seems to be coalescing around a standard of ‘unwillingness or inability’, a 
standard which remains vague and has been abused. Be that as it may, of interest here is 
how the fact of State involvement (whatever the standard may be) has been and can be 
rationalized into a legal ground of justification that may explain why the host State’s 
rights are not impaired by the use of defensive force in its territory. Section 3.1 will 
provide an overview and critique of the three main approaches offered by the scholarly 
literature to answer this question. Section 3.2 then considers whether Article 21 ARS may 
have a role to play in this regard. 
                                                 
86 On the distinction between self-defence against a State or within the State, see K. Trapp, ‘Back to 
Basics: Necessity, Proportionality, and the Right of Self-Defence against non-State Terrorist Actors’, (2007) 
56 ICLQ 141 at 142; Lubell, Extraterritorial, at 36. For a contrary view, see: M.E. O’Connell, ‘Dangerous 
Departures’, (2013) 107 AJIL 380 at 383. 
87  This interpretation of Article 51 and the right of self-defence is accepted here for the sake of 
argument. As noted in the introduction, however, it is important to recall that whether this is accepted as a 
matter of customary law is debatable. 




3.1. Insufficiency of the mainstream approaches  
Legal scholarship has appraised the fact of host State involvement with non-State actors 
in this context in at least three different ways: as an element of the requirement of 
necessity of self-defence, as a breach of international law by the host State through 
complicity with the non-State actors, and as a breach of a due diligence obligation to 
protect the rights of other States within its territory.88 None of these approaches has 
received generalized support in either State practice or the scholarly literature arguably 
because, as will be explained in what follows, each of these approaches is unsatisfactory 
in some way and this diminishes their explanatory power.89 
According to some scholars, host State involvement with the non-State actors is 
relevant to the (customary) requirement of necessity of self-defence.90 Pursuant to this 
view, the right of self-defence of the victim State is triggered by the armed attack of the 
non-State actors and its exercise is limited by the conditions of necessity and 
proportionality. The host State’s involvement with the non-State actor, so this view goes, 
would fall to be analysed under the requirement of necessity. Thus if the host State were 
willing and able to deal with the threat, then the use of force in self-defence would not be 
necessary. Contrariwise, if the host State is unwilling and/or unable to do so, then the 
necessity condition would be met and the victim State could lawfully resort to force 
against the non-State actors in the host State’s territory. 
This is a rather simple way to account for the host State’s involvement with the 
non-State actors in situations of self-defence, but crucially it fails to explain why the 
impairment of host State rights caused by defensive force is justified. This can be 
elucidated by reference to the first two sets of legal relations described in Section 2. The 
requirement of necessity belongs to the first legal relation: the exceptional entitlement to 
use force in self-defence, codified in Article 51 of the Charter. The condition of necessity 
must be met to establish the legality of the resort to defensive force. When host State 
involvement is accounted for under the condition of necessity, it only serves to show that 
in the circumstances the victim State resorted to force against the source of the threat 
                                                 
88 Each of these approaches will be presented in its essential form, in a way which it is believed will 
be more or less acceptable to all scholars maintaining it. Of course, there may be variations in the details 
across the writings of various scholars, though these are immaterial to the point being made in this article.  
89 Hakimi, ‘Defensive Force against Non-State Actors’, at 3-4. 
90 Trapp, ‘Back to Basics’, at 146-147; van Steenberghe, ‘A Step Forward?’, at 199-202; Deeks, 
‘Unwilling or Unable’, at 494-5; C. Tams and J. Devaney, ‘Applying Necessity and Proportionality to Anti-
Terrorist Self-Defence’, (2012) 45 Israel LR 91 at 98-101; D. Akande and T. Liefländer, ‘Clarifying 
Necessity, Imminence, and Proportionality in the Law of Self-Defence’, (2013) 107 AJIL 563 at 564-6. 
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(the non-State actors) lawfully by reference to the norm prohibiting force in international 
relations. But the conclusion about the legality of the resort to force as such says nothing 
about the legality of the impairment of rules in the second set of legal relations (those 
between the victim and host State) affected by the exercise of self-defence—so precisely 
the ones the impairment of which is in need of legal justification. In addition, this 
solution distorts the ‘original purpose’, in Christine Gray’s words, of the requirement of 
necessity: it treats necessity as an enabler of, rather than as a limitation on, the use of 
force.91 
Other scholars have rationalized host State involvement under the notion of 
complicity. On this view, since the host State is complicit in the armed attack of the non-
State actor then it becomes liable to the use of defensive force against the non-State actor 
within its territory.92 This is not an argument about attribution—it is not the case, under 
this approach, that the complicity with the non-State actor determines the attribution of 
that armed attack to the host State. Rather, the position is that the host State’s breach of 
its obligation not to aid or assist in the commission of a wrongful act by another renders 
it liable to the use of defensive force in its territory. This is a questionable conclusion. 
Under the law of State responsibility, complicity in the act of another State entails the 
responsibility of the accomplice. Crucially, the accomplice is responsible for its own 
conduct, for its own aid and assistance in the commission of a wrongful act by another 
State.93 In the current scenario, a host State would be responsible for assisting and aiding 
the non-State actors to engage in an armed attack. The host State’s own wrongdoing (the 
aid and assistance) would entail its responsibility, in the form of cessation (if the act were 
continuing) and reparation towards the victim State. 94  But the accomplice is not 
responsible for the wrongful act of the principal actor. The host State is thus not 
responsible for the private armed attack as such.95 This being the case, the host State is 
not liable, by the mere fact of its complicity with the non-State actors, to the use of force 
                                                 
91 C. Gray, ‘The Limits of Force’ (2016) 376 RCADI 93 at 111. 
92 Eg R. Wolfrum and C.E. Philipp, ‘The Status of the Taliban: Their Obligations and Rights under 
International Law’, (2002) 6 Max Planck Ybk UN Law 559 at 594-5; R. Wolfrum, ‘The Attacks of 
September 11, 2001, the Wars Against the Taliban and Iraq: Is There a need to Reconsider International 
Law on the Recourse to Force and the Rules in Armed Conflict?’, (2003) 7 Max Planck Ybk UN Law 1 at 
37-38; Ruys and Verhoeven, ‘Attacks by Private Actors’, at 315-17. For a summary and critique of this 
approach see: K. Trapp, State Responsibility for International Terrorism (2011), at 58-61. 
93 ARS art 16 Commentary, at para. 10. In the literature, see: B. Graefrath, ‘Complicity in the Law of 
International Responsibility’, (1996) 29 RBDI 370 at 371 (complicity ‘constitutes itself an internationally 
wrongful act of the State … [i]t does not create a kind of co-responsibility in another State’s responsibility 
… [i]t has its own identity as a separate violation of international law’). 
94 See, generally, H. Aust, Complicity and the Law of State Responsibility (2011), at 269-86. 
95 Becker, Terrorism and the State, at 224-5.  
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in its territory. To be successful, this approach must explain why complicity in this 
context entails a consequence not normally entailed under the general law of 
responsibility. As it currently stands, however, the approach simply assumes this to be 
the case; the argument, that is, assumes the conclusion it seeks to prove. 
The same criticism can be levelled at the third and final approach mentioned. 
Several scholars have attempted to ground the justification of the impairment of host 
State rights by defensive force by reference to the host State’s infringement of its due 
diligence obligations. It is well-established that States have an obligation to protect the 
rights of other States within their own territory.96 When non-State actors operating in a 
State’s territory successfully mount an armed attack against the victim State, the host 
State could be found to have breached its due diligence obligation.97 The infringement of 
this obligation, the argument goes, ‘opens up’ the State to force being used within its 
territory.98 As a result, the impairment of host State rights is lawful. But this too is an 
unconvincing argument. 99  Just as with the argument based on complicity, the due-
diligence approach assumes the conclusion. A violation of due diligence obligations 
entails responsibility, including cessation and reparation; but this violation does not 
render the State liable to the use of force within its territory any more than the violation 
of any other rule (other than the prohibition of force) entails this consequence.100 The 
argument fails to explain why a breach of due diligence in the circumstances would 
generate this consequence. As it is, it too simply assumes this to be the case. 
                                                 
96 Corfu Channel (UK v Albania), Judgment of 15 December 1949, [1949] ICJ Rep. 4, at 22. See also, 
in the context of terrorism, General Assembly, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
A/RES/25/2625 (XXV) (24 October 1970). On this obligation see, generally, Trapp, State Responsibility for 
International Terrorism, at 64-82. 
97 On due diligence obligations see: R. Pisillo Mazzeschi, ‘The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature 
of the International Responsibility of States’ (1992) 35 German YIL 5.  
98 See, eg, D. Brown, ‘Use of Force against Terrorism after September 11th: State Responsibility, 
Self-Defense and Other Responses’, (2003) 11 Cardozo JICL 1, at 15, 30-32; T. Gazzini, The Changing Rules 
on the Use of Force in International Law (2005), at 189; Reinold, ‘State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the 
Right of Self-Defense Post-9/11’, at 284; Trapp, ‘Can Non-State Actors Mount an Armed Attack?’, in M. 
Weller (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (2015), 679 at 695; L. Moir, ‘Action 
Against Host States of Terrorist Groups’, in M. Weller (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in 
International Law (2015), 720 at 730. For a similar argument, see: R. Wedgwood, ‘Responding to Terrorism: 
The Strikes against Bin Laden’, (1999) 24 Yale JIL 559 at 565; B.A. Feinstein, ‘A Paradigm for the Analysis 
of the Legality of the Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists and States that Aid and Abet Them’, (2004) 
17 Transnational Lawyer 51 at 77. 
99 It is moreover problematic in that, by definition, a State’s inability to deal with the non-State actor 
will not infringe its due diligence obligation. Due diligence obligations are obligations of means, not of 
result, and are premised upon the capacity of the State, in the circumstances, to engage in that conduct. 
See: F. Lozano Contreras, La noción de debida diligencia en derecho internacional público (2007), at 220-8. 
100  Similarly: Ruys and Verhoeven, ‘Attacks by Private Actors’, at 317-318; Ruys, ‘Thin Blue Line’, 
285; Antonopoulos, ‘Force by Armed Groups’, at 169-70. 
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 Both of the last two approaches, based on the notion of complicity and due 
diligence obligations, are underpinned to some extent by countermeasures-like reasoning. 
In essence, both approaches posit that one violation of international law (the complicity 
in another’s wrongful act, or the breach of due diligence duties) justifies another violation 
of international law (the encroachment of host State rights). But countermeasures may 
not themselves involve the use of force,101 so it is not clear why the breach of obligations 
in these circumstances would attract a forcible response. 
 
3.2. Self-defence as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness: An alternative 
solution? 
None of the mainstream approaches provide a satisfactory explanation to the ‘dilemma’ 
of impairment of host State rights by the use of defensive force against non-State actors 
within that State’s territory. Could Article 21 provide an alternative solution? 
The scenario where a State exercises self-defence against a non-State actor in 
another State’s territory is not the ‘essential’ situation falling within the ambit of Article 
21—that of inter-State self-defence—as noted earlier. Rather, the situation of the host 
State is better assimilated to one involving a third party affected by the exercise of self-
defence. The action in self-defence exists as between the victim State and the non-State 
actor, and the host State is an (affected) third State. As was mentioned in Section 2.2, the 
ILC does not answer the question whether Article 21 can justify the impairment of third 
State rights by an action in self-defence. The matter, it says, is left ‘open’. In this way, the 
ILC does not foreclose the possibility that Article 21 may extend to the justification of 
the impairment of third party rights. Insofar as Article 21 codifies an effect of the right 
of self-defence at customary law,102 the question then is whether as a matter of customary 
law the exercise of self-defence permits these intrusions on third parties’ rights.  
There are two relevant bodies of law relevant to this question. First, the law of 
neutrality which protects the rights of, and imposes duties on, third parties during armed 
conflict. A third party may, by its involvement with one of the parties in conflict, forfeit 
its neutral protection and render itself liable to attack by the opposing party. Where this 
is the case, there is no role for Article 21 to play: the law of neutrality would itself resolve 
the ‘dilemma’ of host State rights. Second, is the right of self-defence itself. In certain 
                                                 
101 ARS art 50(1)(a). 
102 Recall that art 51 of the Charter and art 21 of the ARS reflect different effects of the customary 
right of self-defence: art 51 concerns the effect of self-defence on the prohibition of force, art 21 its effect 
on the second set of legal relations. 
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circumstances—whether or not a third State is involved in any way in the conflict—a 
self-defending State may lawfully impair (some of) the third States’ rights. Does this 
extend to the impairment of any of its rights? If so, such an effect could be rationalized 
under Article 21 of the ARS. 
 
3.2.1. What role for the law of neutrality? 
Under the law of neutrality, neutral States have a right not to be affected by the conflict 
and they have duties of non-participation and impartiality. 103  A neutral State which 
renders assistance to one of the parties to an armed conflict thereby violates its neutral 
duties, and becomes liable to reprisals by the affected belligerent. Nevertheless, this is not 
a liability to forcible reprisals. Since international law prohibits armed reprisals,104 the 
affected belligerent may not use force against the neutral State on this ground. According 
to Michael Bothe, the only circumstances in which the neutral State may be liable to 
forcible attack by the affected belligerent is when its violation of neutral duties amounts 
to an armed attack: ‘a reaction against violations of neutrality which would involve the 
use of force against another State is permissible only where the violation of the law 
triggering that reaction itself constitutes an illegal armed attack.’105 The standard is high: 
not all support for an aggressor is equivalent to an armed attack.106 Bothe notes that the 
non-neutral services rendered by the US, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to Iraq, for example, 
‘did not entitle Iran to adopt measures against those states involving the use of military 
force.’107 Applying this to the present context,108 the use of force would be permissible 
within the host State’s territory whenever its assistance to the non-State actors amounts 
to an armed attack. 
The difficulty is, of course, that of determining when assistance amounts to an 
armed attack: is attribution necessary, or will an indirect attack suffice? By requiring a 
degree of State involvement with the non-State actors (or any other State in conflict) 
amounting to ‘an armed attack’ against the other party, the law of neutrality reaches the 
                                                 
103 M. Bothe, ‘The Law of Neutrality’, in D. Fleck (ed.), Handbook of International Humanitarian Law 
(3rd edn, 2013), at 549. 
104 ARS art 50(1)(a). 
105 Bothe, ‘Neutrality’, at 558. 
106 Id. 
107 Ibid, at fn. 39. 
108 Note that the applicability of the law of neutrality to conflicts between States and non-State actors 
is contested. See, eg, the exchange between K. Chang, ‘Enemy Status and Military Detention in the War 
Against Al-Qaeda’, (2011) 47 Texas ILJ 1; R. Ingber, ‘Untangling Belligerency from Neutrality in the 
Conflict with Al-Qaeda’, (2011) 47 Texas ILJ 76; K.J. Heller, ‘The Law of Neutrality does not Apply in the 
Conflict with Al-Qaeda, and it is a Good Thing too: A Response to Chang’, (2011) 47 Texas ILJ 115. 
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same stalemate as any arguments based on Article 51: failing attribution of the non-State 
actors’ conduct to the host State, there will be no entitlement for the victim to use force 
against, or even within, the host State. A plausible avenue for development could be the 
lowering of the threshold of host State involvement with the non-State actors, such that, 
for example, unwillingness and inability to deal with the private groups might suffice. But 
there are two weaknesses in this argument. First, it is difficult to see how unwillingness 
and, especially, inability might constitute an involvement equivalent to an armed attack. 
Second, it would probably be simpler to redefine the notion as a matter of the right of 
self-defence itself. At any rate, given the reluctance to redefine the notion of armed 
attack in the context of the right of self-defence, it is highly unlikely that the law of 
neutrality might develop in this direction. 
 
3.2.2. Self-defence and third parties 
The other possibility is that the right of self-defence itself may allow a State to use of 
force against third parties or, more likely, that it permits the impairment of third party 
rights by self-defensive force. Certain impairment of third-State rights during hostilities 
have been justified on the grounds of a State’s exercise of self-defence. This is the case, 
for example, of the institution of war-zones or maritime exclusion zones on the high seas, 
where they affect the freedom of navigation of all States.109 While in the past these would 
have been grounded on the exercise of belligerent rights, in recent decades recourse to 
self-defence as a legal basis of justification for these interferences is increasing.110 
States having justified interferences with neutral shipping on the basis of self-
defence include France, during the Algerian emergency of the mid 1950s, and Pakistan, 
during the Indo-Pakistani conflict of 1965.111 The UK justified the institution of a 200 
nautical miles exclusion zone around the Falkland/Malvinas and the institution of 
‘security bubbles’ around its warships traveling through the Atlantic Ocean on the right 
of self-defence.112 These zones were initially applied only against Argentine warships, 
though they were later extended to ‘any other ship, whether naval or merchant vessel, 
                                                 
109 C. Michaelsen, ‘Maritime Exclusion Zones in Times of Armed Conflict at Sea: Legal 
Controversies Still Unresolved’, (2003) 8 J Conflict Security Law 363 at 388.  
110 N. Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea (2011), at 275. 
111 D. Humphrey, ‘Belligerent Interdiction of Neutral Shipping in International Armed Conflict’, 
(1997) 2 J Conflict & Security Law 23 at 29. 
112 See, eg, Debate on the subject of the Falkland Islands, in (1982) 53 BYIL 540 (statement by 
Margaret Thatcher); and the various letters to the President of the UN Security Council in (1982) 53 BYIL 
539-549. 
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which … is operating in support of’ Argentina. 113  Note, however, that in practice 
interference with neutral shipping in these circumstances has been rather limited. 114 
During the Iran-Iraq war at least two States, the UK 115  and the US,116  accepted the 
principle that self-defence could justify interference with neutral shipping when there was 
reasonable suspicion of non-neutral service.117 In particular, the UK held that: 
a State … actively engaged in an armed conflict, is entitled in exercise of its 
inherent right of self-defence to stop and search a foreign merchant ship on the 
high seas if there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the ship is taking 
arms to the other side for use in the conflict.118 
On the whole, the Iraqi and Iranian war-zones were widely criticized by other States and 
by the Security Council. But as emphasized by Ross Leckow, these critiques responded 
to the ‘little respect … shown by either side for [the] principle of restraint’ in their 
enforcement of these areas. It was ‘because of this complete disregard for 
“reasonableness” that attacks on neutral merchant vessels on both sides must be 
condemned as violations of international law.’119 Most recently, after the 9/11 attacks, the 
US engaged in the boarding of neutral vessels suspected of transporting terrorists. While 
the explicit legal basis for this was never articulated, the US generally justified its action in 
this regard on the right of self-defence. 120  As this practice shows, interference with 
neutral shipping is permitted when there is a suspicion of collaboration between the third 
State and the aggressor. 
The legal basis of interference with neutral shipping, to be sure, remains a matter 
of some debate: some uphold a wider right of interference as a matter of belligerent 
rights, and therefore available to both victim and aggressor State, whereas others—like 
the examples just mentioned—opt for a narrower right based on a State’s exercise of 
self-defence. 121  As observed by Natalie Klein, the invocations of self-defence are of 
                                                 
113 British letter, 9 April 1982, addressed to the President of the UN Security Council in (1982) 53 
BYIL 539. 
114 R. Leckow, ‘The Iran-Iraq Conflict in the Gulf - The Law of War Zones’, (1988) 37 ICLQ 629 at 
634. 
115 For the UK’s position, see: C. Gray, ‘The British Position in Regard to the Gulf Conflict’, (1988) 
47 ICLQ 420. 
116 The US subsequently asserted a different position, and it may be wondered if this was in response 
to the indiscriminate policy followed by Iran and Iraq in the enforcement of these rights. On the evolution 
of the US position, see: Humphrey, ‘Belligerent Interdiction’, at 33-4. 
117 Humphrey, ‘Belligerent Interdiction’, at 32-3. 
118 Quoted by Gray, ‘British Position’, at 423. 
119 Leckow, ‘Iran-Iraq Conflict’, at 644. 
120 On which see: Klein, Maritime Security, at 274. 
121 P. Wendel, State Responsibility for Interferences with the Freedom of Navigation in Public International Law 
(2007), at 233-6. 
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special significance given their context. In her view, ‘[t]his recent practice should be seen 
against previous practice where there was far less acceptance of reliance on the right of 
self-defence to justify intrusions against the freedom of navigation on the high seas.’122 
This practice, at the very least, shows States’ willingness accept the impairment of the 
rights of third States in the exercise of self-defence in certain, if limited, circumstances. 
The reasoning underpinning the legal justification of these interferences with 
third party rights could be extended, by analogy, to the ‘dilemma’ of host State rights as 
well. The analogy could be built on the UK’s position on self-defence-based 
interferences with neutral shipping, quoted earlier, as this is the clearest articulation of a 
justification for impairment of third State rights. Under the UK position, a State acting in 
self-defence may impair the rights of third States to freedom of navigation only where 
there is suspicion of involvement between the third State and the aggressor. Involvement, 
in this regard, amounts to assistance in the form of arms-provision—so a far lower 
standard than what is necessary for that assistance to itself constitute an armed attack. 
Applying this same reasoning to the non-State actor scenario, the victim State exercises 
its right of self-defence against the non-State actor and, in so doing, it impairs the rights 
of a third party, the host State. Such interference may justified under self-defence so long 
as there exists some measure of host State involvement with the non-State actor, an 
involvement which need not amount to an armed attack and could, if accepted, be as 
limited as unwillingness and inability. Nevertheless, given the different extent to which 
third State rights are impaired in the two scenarios (in one case, the right of freedom of 
navigation, in the other, the rights to territorial sovereignty, non-intervention, and so on), 
it may be necessary to qualify the UK position above if it is to apply in respect of host-
States: rather than a reasonable suspicion of host State involvement, host State 
involvement must actually exist and must, therefore, be proven. 
To put this approach in terms of Articles 51 of the Charter and 21 of the ARS, 
the resort to force in self-defence against the aggressor (the non-State actor) would be 
grounded on Article 51 of the Charter—which, it may be recalled, is applicable only to 
the question of the legality of the use of force by reference to the general prohibition—
whereas the interference with third State rights may be grounded on Article 21 ARS.123 
Such an approach, which relies on Article 21 in addition to Article 51, overcomes the 
                                                 
122 Klein, Maritime Security, at 275. 
123 For a similar view, see: R. O’Keefe, ‘War and the Law of Nations: A General History. By Stephen C 
Neff [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2005. xii. 398 and (Biibliography, Table of Cases, Table of 
Treaties, Index, 44 pp. Hardback £55.00. ISBN 0-521-66205-2.]’, (2007) 66 CLJ 461 at 462.  
© Federica I Paddeu 
 
26 
explanatory difficulties of the mainstream theories reviewed earlier. To begin with, it 
relies on the concept of ‘circumstances precluding wrongfulness’, a category of rules of 
the law of responsibility whose function is precisely that of justifying the infringement of 
legal rules. Moreover, the relevant circumstance precluding wrongfulness, Article 21, can 
justify the breach of obligations brought about through the use of force, which no other 
circumstance precluding wrongfulness can do.124  
 
4. Conclusion 
The use of force against non-State actors presents, for international law, a clear dilemma: 
it is not possible to expect the victim of non-State actors’ assaults to tolerate that conduct, 
but by the same token the rights of the host State must be upheld. State practice, albeit 
far from the generality, uniformity and consistency necessary for the modification of 
customary law, shows an increased acceptance of a right of self-defence against non-State 
actors—but the recognition of this right must overcome an important difficulty: how 
legally to justify the interference with the rights of the host State by the use of force in its 
territory? 
 Scholars working in this field have proposed different explanations for the 
justification of interferences with host State’s rights. Building from the practice of States, 
they all rely, in some form or another, on the involvement of the host State with the non-
State actors. Nevertheless, they disagree as to the rationalization of the fact of 
involvement into a ground of legal justification. Thus, some scholars view host State 
involvement as relevant to the condition of necessity of self-defence, others as a form of 
complicity, and others still as a breach of the host State’s due diligence obligation to 
protect the rights of the victim State in its territory. But none of these approaches is 
sufficient: at the crucial point, that of explaining why the host State is liable to the use of 
force within its territory, they all contain leaps in the reasoning. 
 This study has proposed an alternative answer to this question, one based on 
Article 21 of the ARS, namely on self-defence in its role as a circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness. This provision, albeit much misunderstood in the literature, has an 
important role to play in inter-State invocations of self-defence. It is Article 21 which 
explains why force that is lawful under Article 51 of the Charter does not constitute an 
infringement of other rights of the target State, most importantly of its right of territorial 
                                                 
124 For an overview, see Corten, Droit contre la guerre, at ch 4. 
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sovereignty. While Article 21 assumes an inter-State use of force, in which there is 
identity of the parties to the relevant legal relations (self-defence, territorial sovereignty, 
and so on), its Commentary shows that Article 21 may extend to the justification of the 
interference with the rights of third States, namely situations in which there is a mismatch 
between the parties to the relevant legal relations. Indeed, the right of self-defence may, 
in certain circumstances, impair the rights of third parties. Thus, States have justified the 
institution of maritime exclusion zones, affecting third party rights of free navigation, on 
the basis of self-defence. Perhaps host State involvement with the non-State actors may 
be reconceptualized as one of the situations in which the right of self-defence permits 
interference with a third party, the host State. This way, the legal relation between the 
victim State and the non-State actor would be governed by Article 51, and the legal 
relations between the victim State and the host State would be governed, and thereby 
justified, by Article 21. 
 To be sure, a solution based on Article 21 is still far from being entirely 
satisfactory. This is not so much as a result of the approach itself, but of the difficulties 
inherent in the claim that force can be lawfully used in self-defence against non-State 
actors. These difficulties are both legal and practical. Legally, any theory about the use of 
self-defence against non-State actors must overcome an important hurdle: that of 
grounding the illegality of the armed attack. An armed attack, to trigger the right of self-
defence, must not be merely a ‘factual’ armed attack:125 it is necessary that it also be 
unlawful. If this were not the case, then the continued validity of the principle ‘no self-
defence against self-defence’126 would be undercut. For if all that is necessary is a factual 
armed attack, regardless of its legal qualification, then a use of force in self-defence can, 
too, be a factual armed attack (if it attains the required gravity threshold) triggering the 
aggressor’s own right of self-defence. The result is a logical spiral of violence, where self-
defence can be invoked against self-defence. Yet, there is no identifiable ban on the use 
of force by non-State actors.127 Practically, the desirability of this development remains 
                                                 
125 On which see, eg, Ruys, Armed Attack, at 490 (arguing that Article 51 neither prohibits armed 
attacks nor points to their illegality). 
126 Ministries trial, 329; The Maria, 361. See also, Lubell, Extraterritorial, at 41; Dinstein, War, Aggression 
and Self-Defence, at 190. 
127 Kammerhofer, Uncertainty, at 40; A. de Hoogh, ‘Restrictivist Reasoning on the Ratione Personae 
Dimension of Armed Attacks in the Post 9/11 World’ (2016) 29 LJIL 19, at 22. But see van Steenberghe, 
Légitime defense, at 289-90. For a proposal in this regard, see: A.M. Slaughter and W. Burke-White, ‘An 
International Constitutional Moment’, (2002) 43 HILJ 1, at 2. 
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questionable, as recently shown by Christine Gray, who has argued that the use of force 
against non-State actors is far from an effective instrument.128 
Article 21 can provide a sound framework to address the ‘dilemma’ of host State 
rights. This solution still requires, however, acceptance as a matter of positive law, 
through the practice of States and their opinio juris. But the availability of the right of self-
defence against non-State actors still has many hurdles to overcome. 
 
 
                                                 
128 Gray, ‘The Limits of Force’, 93-197. 
